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Therapeutic jurisprudence is concerned with the law's impact on
emotional life and psychological well-being; it is interested not only in
law reform, but also in how existing law may be most therapeutically
applied.' Although the study of the law as a therapeutic agent may be
a relatively new field,2 the combination of common and civilian tradi-
tions of Louisiana law incorporates the concepts of therapeutic juris-
prudence. In his article, The Judicial Revival of Louisiana's Civilian
Tradition: A Surprising Triumph for the American Influence,3 Professor
Kenneth Murchison recognizes that the Louisiana judiciary is an
American creation, however, its method of interpreting law derives
from the civilian tradition of Western Europe, which recognizes that
decisions rendered by the judiciary have an impact on society.4 In this
Article, I will show how Louisiana jurisprudence incorporates the
concepts of therapeutic jurisprudence.
In his law review article, Professor Murchison' reviews the theo-
retical framework of Louisiana jurisprudence as described by Justices
Mack Barham and Albert Tate, both of whom served on the Louisiana
Supreme Court during the 1970s. 6
As summarized by Professor Murchison, Justice Barham
described Louisiana civil law and jurisprudence as "a heritage" that is
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"essentially a matter of technique rather than substance."7 The main
component of this technique is a rejection of the common law doctrine
of stare decisis, which frees civilian judges from past decisions that do
not serve present social needs.' While Justice Barham recognized that
legislation is the primary source of law, he also recognized the legit-
imacy of other sources, including customs, and he argued that judicial
decisions should be evaluated by their potential for producing socially
desirable results.9
Louisiana jurisprudence, as described by Justice Tate, views the
judge as the legislator's colleague, whose job it is to translate abstract
legislation into solutions for specific problems."° The judge is to apply
a functional approach that relies not on "logic alone," but also on"policy considerations of what rule is best for the community as a
whole and of what rule provides the fairest solution of the present con-
troversy."" To that end, while preexisting doctrine governs the vast
majority of cases, the judge's role includes that of "lawmaker" in three
particular settings: when the legislature fails to provide a rule; when a
new legislative rule needs to be fitted into the existing legal frame-
work; and when a "substantial change in social conditions" makes
application of the "literal wording" of the legislative rule inappro-
priate." In the civilian tradition, the judge has a duty to consider the
policy implications of a decision and to render a decision that "justly
resolves the particular dispute."' 3 The judge's lawmaking function is
necessary to keep the law "alive and current and responsive to the
changing needs of society."' 4
Therapeutic jurisprudence calls for the systematic study of the
therapeutic or antitherapeutic effects of the law.' Other things being
equal, positive therapeutic effects are desired and should be a proper
aim of law, and antitherapeutic effects are undesired and should be
avoided or minimized. 6 In our Louisiana tradition, the effects of the
law are also a factor. In a judicial consideration of the applicable law
to a particular proceeding, the judge is not to decide cases "simply on
the basis of the individual equities of the parties" but rather, the
7. Id. at 6.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 7.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 10.
14. Id.
15. Winick, supra note 2, at 185.
16. Id. at 188. Mr. Winick recognized that "other things" may rarely be equal, and there
may be justification for a legal rule or practice found to produce antitherapeutic consequences.
[Vol. 24:335
Louisiana Jurisprudence
judge's function is to select or to create a rule "of general application
to other interests to be similarly situated in the future."' 7 Surely, this
consideration encompasses the ideals of considering the therapeutic
effects of the decisions rendered.
Having recognized that there can be both therapeutic and anti-
therapeutic effects of judicial decisions, I would like to offer this
consideration concerning the use of therapeutic jurisprudence in the
appellate courts. In his Article, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the Appel-
late Arena, David Wexler asks, "Does the ability to issue advisory
opinions enhance a court's ability to create 'therapeutic' doctrines?"' 8
As a general rule, courts are not allowed to issue advisory opinions and
there are strong reasons for such a prohibition.
First, we must be mindful that the framers of the Constitution
built into the tripartite federal government a self-executing safeguard
against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of another. 9 It has long been held that Congress may not
execute the laws or exercise judicial power to revise final judgments
rendered by the courts.2° The judicial power to decide cases and
controversies does not include a provision for purely advisory opinions
and it does not permit the federal courts to resolve nonjusticiable
questions."' These restrictions on judicial activities are necessary "to
help ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch and to prevent
the Judiciary from encroaching into areas reserved for the other
branches."22
From this tradition the requirement of a "justiciable contro-
versy" has evolved. A justiciable controversy connotes, in the present
sense, an existing, actual, and substantial dispute, as distinguished
from one that is merely hypothetical or abstract, and a dispute that
involves the legal relations of parties who have real adverse interests
upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate through
a decree of a conclusive character.23 It is a real and substantial con-
troversy to which the law provides specific relief through a decree of
conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be given a hypothetical set of facts.24
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This concept prevents the courts from rendering advisory opin-
ions. In federal law, the restriction is rooted in the "cases and
controversies" requirement in Article III of the United States Consti-
tution. In Louisiana law, it arises from the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure and our jurisprudence.25
Therapeutic Jurisprudence has been accused of being paternal-
istic, 26 possibly because it promotes the judicial powers beyond those
envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. While most jurists
would agree that the practice of rendering decisions with a positive
effect on society is desirable, we must be mindful that these decisions
be rendered in the context of real-time controversies. The grant of
power to the judiciary does not, and should not, include the ability to
influence social trends before those trends occur. It is the job of the
judiciary to respond to social change within the perimeters of the law
as it exists at that time, not to initiate or prevent social change. Thus,
the ban on advisory opinions provides a necessary check on the judi-
ciary, preventing the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence from
evolving into a paternalistic force in violation of the Constitution.
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